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SOME DEVELOPMENTS OF THE 
1960s TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH 
TO MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL TORT LIABILITY♦
Alan D. Reid t
The past few decades have seen a tremendous upswing in 
inter-jurisdictional travel, which has served as a catalyst for aca­
demic and judicial inquiries into the validity of existing rules for 
determining tort liability for injuries incurred in a multi-jurisdic­
tional setting. The question has repeatedly been raised whether 
traditional conflicts rules are adequate to satisfy the demands of 
either the parties involved, or the states whose laws are invoked 
for purposes of allowing or rejecting a particular claim. The pur­
pose of this paper is to outline some considerations that a lawyer 
involved in automobile litigation, or indeed any tort litigation, 
might well take into account in evaluating a client’s prospects for 
recovery, or for avoiding liability, as the case may be.
To put these remarks into perspective, perhaps it would be 
advantageous to illustrate at the outset three simple, yet classic, 
inter-jurisdictional problems, each based on the assumption that 
litigation is commenced in New Brunswick.
Case 1:
A plaintiff and defendant are resident and domiciled in Quebec 
at the time o f an accident occurring in Quebec. The plaintiff, 
a gratuitous passenger, is injured while being transported in an 
automobile driven by the defendant. Subsequent to the accident, 
the defendant takes up residence in N ew  Brunswick and an action 
is brought by the plaintiff against the defendant in the N ew  
Brunswick Supreme Court. The Court is faced with the ques­
tion whether, in the absence o f proof o f gross negligence, the de­
fendant ought to be held liable under the law of Quebec, the 
lex loci o f the accident, or whether the defendant should be im­
munized from liability by virtue o f  the gratuitous passenger pro­
vision in the N ew  Brunswick Motor Vehicle A ct.1
* A paper presented at the mid-winter meeting o f the Canadian Bar A s­
sociation (N .B . Branch) in M oncton, N .B ., Feb. 20, 1970. 
t  Assistant Professor o f Law, University of N ew  Brunswick.
1 (1 9 5 5 ), 4 Eliz. II, c. 13, s.242 (N .B .) “. . . no person transported 
by the owner or driver o f a motor vehicle as his guest without payment 
for such transportation shall have a cause o f action for damages 
against the owner or driver for injury, death or loss, in case o f accident, 
unless the accident was caused by the gross negligence or wilful and 
wanton misconduct of the owner or driver o f the motor vehicle and 
unless the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct contributed 
to the injury, death or loss, for which the action is brought”. A  number 
of Canadian cases have dealt with problems imposed by gratuitous 
passenger rules, including: H ow ells v. Wilson (1 9 3 6 ), 69 Que. K.B. 32;
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T w o N ew  Brunswick residents are travelling in an automobile 
in the United States. One o f the parties dies as a result o f  an 
accident which would, had the accident occurred in N ew  Bruns­
wick, give rise to a right in the wife o f the deceased to recover 
damages under the N ew  Brunswick Fatal Accidents Act.2 On 
the assumption that the law o f the place where the accident has 
taken place denies recovery to the wife, under its equivalent legis­
lation, where there has been a settlement between the insurer and 
the deceased prior to his death, is the N ew  Brunswick Supreme 
Court, in an action based on our statute, permitted to grant re­
covery? Or does the fact that a valid defence exists under the 
law o f the place where the accident takes place provide an ob­
stacle to relief?
Case 3:
A plaintiff from New Brunswick, travelling on a United States 
highway, is involved in an accident with a defendant from On­
tario. Assuming that the law o f the place where the accident 
occurs has no contributory negligence statute and holds con­
tributory negligence as a total bar to a p la intiffs recovery, is a 
N ew  Brunswick court required to deny recovery in accordance 
with the law o f  the place where the accident has taken place, or 
may it determine liability by reference to com m on law and statu­
tory standards in effect in New Brunswick at the time o f the 
accident?2“
In approaching these issues, it should be recognized that a 
strategy-conscious lawyer may be able to avoid some of the choice 
of law problems by shopping for a suitable forum, one which will
L ieff v. Palm er (1 9 3 7 ), 63 Que. K.B. 278: M cLean  v. Pettigrew, 
[1945] S.C.R. 62; and, in N ew  Brunswick, Johnston v. Arbeau  (1960)
24 D.L.R. (2 d ) 740 (C .A .) , and M artin  v. M armen  (1 9 6 9 ), 6 D.L.R. 
(3 d ) 77 (C .A .) . Som e U.S. cases are: Babcock  v. Jackson, 240 
N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1 9 6 3 ); Clark v. Clark. 222 A. 2d 205 (1966) (Sup. 
Ct. N .H .);  K ell v. H enderson, 270 N.Y .S. 2d 552 (1 9 6 6 ); D ym  v. 
G ordon, 262 N .Y.S. 2d 463 (1 9 6 5 ); M acey  v. R ozbicki, 21A N .Y .S. 2d 
591 (1 9 6 6 ); M iller v. M iller. 290 N .Y.S. 2d 734 (1 9 6 8 ); Tooke  v. 
L opez, 249 N .E . 2d 394 (1969) (Court o f Appeals o f N .Y .) .
2 (1 9 6 9 ), 18 Eliz. II, c. 6, s. 4 (1 )  (N .B .) . One might consider gen­
erally, in relation to  this problem: C.P.R . v. Parent, [1917] A.C. 195; 
K ilberg  v. N .E . A irlines Inc., 211 N .Y .S. 2d 133 (1 9 6 1 ); Reich  v. 
Purcell, 432 P. 2d 727 (1967) (Sup. C t  C alif.); Färber v. Sm olack, 282 
N.Y.S. 2d 248 (1967) (Court o f Appeals o f N .Y .).
2» Consider in relation to this problem: Brown  v. Poland  (1 9 5 2 ), 6 
W.W.R. (N .S .) 368 (Alta. Sup. C t.); Anderson  v. Eric Anderson Radio  
and T.V. P ty. L td. (1 9 6 4 ), 65 S.R. (N .S .W .) 279, a f fd  (1 9 6 5 ), 39 
A.L.J.R. 357; K o o p  v. Bebb  (1 9 5 1 ), 84 Com. L.R. 629 (H igh Ct. 
Australia); Brownlie and Webb, C ontributory Negligence and the 
Rule in Phillips v. E yre  (1 9 6 2 ), 40 Can. Bar Rev. 76; North, C on­
tributory Negligence and the C onflict o f Laws  (1 9 6 7 ), 16 Int. L.Q. 
379.
14 U.N.B. L A W  JO U R N A L
apply its own law allowing the claim. Normally, however, the 
lawyer is hampered in this by restrictions imposed first, on service 
out of the jurisdiction, and second, on the enforcement of default 
judgments in foreign jurisdictions in which the defendant may have 
exigible assets. In other cases, a plaintiff may be forced into suing 
in New Brunswick simply because it is too expensive or incon­
venient to conduct litigation in another forum. In certain cases, 
these difficulties may be alleviated by such statutory provisions as 
Sections 243 (1 ) ( c ) and 24 of the Insurance Act,3 compelling 
insurance companies to appear on behalf of their insureds in liti­
gation commenced outside the province; but even these provisions, 
binding on insurance companies, will be of no benefit to a plain­
tiff if (a ) the defendant is not insured, or (b ) if the injury occurs 
outside Canada or (c ) presumably if the plaintiff is unable to get 
an order for service ex juris on the defendant from the court in 
which the action is commenced, assuming it is not the residence of 
the defendant. In brief, there are obstacles which cannot be over­
come even by tactical litigation, and which can only be overcome 
through convincing a Court to choose, as the applicable law, the law 
which counsel feels ought to be applied in favour of his client’s 
claim.
What then are the limits within which one may argue choice 
of law in New Brunswick at the present time? Let me refer initially 
to the skeletal facts of a recent New Brunswick case, Martin v. 
Marmen.4 Three persons, temporarily resident and working in 
Ontario, took an automobile trip to New Brunswick in an Ontario 
car. En route, they were involved in an accident in Quebec. As­
suming that ordinary negligence could have been proved (it was 
not), the question was argued whether the New Brunswick court 
could take into account the conceded fact that under Quebec law 
liability would arise? Or would the court be precluded from
3 (1 9 6 8 ), 17 Eliz. II, c. 6 (N .B .) . S. 243(1 ) ( c )  provides: “Every 
motor vehicle liability policy issued in N ew  Brunswick shall provide 
that, in the case o f liability arising out o f the ownership, use or op­
eration of the automobile in any province or territory of Canada, the 
insured, by acceptance o f the policy, constitutes and appoints the 
insurer his irrevocable attorney to appear and defend in any prov­
ince or territory o f Canada in which an action is brought against the 
insured arising out o f  the ownership, use or operation of the auto­
m obile.” S. 2 4 (3 ) provides: “A license to carry on automobile in­
surance in the Province is subject to the following conditions: (b )  
in any action in another province or territory of Canada against the 
licensed insurer, or its insured, arising out o f an automobile accident 
in that province or territory, the insurer shall appear . . . .”
4 (1 9 6 9 ), 6 D.L.R. (3d ) 77 (N .B .C .A .).
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awarding damages because of the gratuitous passenger provision in 
our Motor Vehicle Act? An argument was made by counsel for 
the plaintiff that the law of Quebec should be applied in deter­
mining liability arising out of a Quebec accident. In the course of 
judgment, Bridges C.J.N.B., speaking for the Court of Appeal 
said:
The accident took place in the Province of Quebec and it was
agreed by counsel at the trial that under the laws of that Province 
it was not necessary for a gratuitous passenger to establish gross 
negligence in order to recover from the driver. It was submitted 
that Quebec law should apply and that the plaintiffs, even if only 
gratuitous passengers, were entitled to recover if they could estab­
lish ordinary negligence on the part o f the defendant . . . .  It has 
been clearly laid down that an action will not lie in one province 
for a wrong committed in another unless two condiUons are ful­
filled. First, the wrong must be o f such a character that it would 
have been actionable if committed in the Province o f the forum  
and, secondly, it must not have been justifiable under the law of 
the Province where it was done.5
In a sense, Bridges C.J. was quite correct when he said that the 
rule governing liability for a foreign tort has been clearly laid down. 
The traditional approach to solving problems of a multi-jurisdic­
tional nature has been to invoke a definitive rule formulated to 
simplify the solution of cases and to provide for the lawyer an 
element of predictability. Nevertheless, the rule referred to, com­
monly known as the rule in Phillips v. Eyre* has for years been 
viewed with a certain amount of question. What, for example, is 
the precise meaning of such words as “actionable”, “justifiable” , 
“act” , and “wrong”, all used in the formulation of the rule? Is the 
rule calculated to provide the court with a basis for choosing which 
law is to be applied in determining the question of liability, or does 
the rule simply establish a jurisdictional threshold, a prerequisite to 
a court’s adjudicating upon a tort committed in another jurisdic­
tion?7 Is the rule partly a jurisdictional rule and partly a choice 
of law rule, in the sense that the requirement that the wrong be 
actionable in the forum is calculated to provide the court with 
jurisdiction, and the condition that the act must not have been 
justifiable under the law of the place where it was committed is 
calculated to lead the court to apply the law of the place where the 
tort was committed in the actual determination of the substantive
5 Ibid., at p. 80.
e (1 8 7 0 ), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 (Exch. C h .).
7 See Spence, C onflict o f Laws in A utom obile Negligence Cases (1 9 4 9 ),
27 Can. Bar Rev. 661.
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issues affecting liability?8 Or does the rule require “double action­
ability”, in the sense that the act must give rise to a cause of action 
both in the forum and in the place where the tort occurred, before 
the forum may give relief?3 Or is the forum entitled to give relief 
in respect of any foreign tort which it recognizes as being action­
able, as long as the act is not justifiable, meaning not legally 
innocent, under the law of the place where the act was committed? 
Each of these interpretations of the rule has received some support. 
However, it is the last interpretation which seems to have received 
the strongest judicial support. The English Court of Appeal, in 
Machado v. Forties'0 imposed liability for a libel which had taken 
place in Brazil, even though the statement did not give rise to civil 
liability under the law of Brazil. The fact that it might give rise to 
criminal liability in Brazil was held sufficient by the Court to satisfy 
the requirement of non-justifiability. This proposition was carried 
to an extreme in Canada in the case of McLean v. Pettigrew.11 
There the Supreme Court of Canada was prepared to attribute non­
justifiability to a non-actionable act taking place in Ontario, not 
on the basis that the act had given rise to conviction under the On­
tario highway legislation (because in fact the defendant had been 
acquitted of responsibility under the statute) but because, in the 
opinion of the Court, the act did amount to a breach of that legis­
lation, the acquittal notwithstanding.12
It would appear then that in applying the traditional approach 
to the hypothetical claims outlined at the outset, one should take 
into account the following considerations:
(1 ) Whether the facts, as outlined, give rise to liability 
under the law of New Brunswick, on the assumption that the facts 
surrounding the injury all occurred in New Brunswick;
(2 ) Whether the law of the place where the conduct oc­
curred provides a defence to a claim of civil liability, and also, what 
the implications of the conduct are in terms of condemnation by 
the state through criminal or quasi-criminal legislation.
Dissatisfaction with this approach lies, first, in the idea that, if 
strictly applied, it may lead irresistibly to solutions which are un­
See Yntema (1 9 4 9 ), 27 Can. Bar Rev. 116; also Boys v. Chaplin, 
[1968] 1 A ll E.R. 283, per D iplock  L.J.
9 This appears to be, as will be discussed herein, the ultimate holding of 
the House o f Lords in Chaplin v. Boys, í 1969] 3 W.L.R. 322.
[1897] 2 Q.B. 231.
«  [1945] S.C.R. 62.
12 But see L ieff v. Palm er (1 9 3 7 ), 63 Que. K.B. 278, which earlier had 
refused to adopt similar reasoning.
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just as between the parties, and which are irrational inasmuch as 
they may be inconsistent with the policies behind the particular 
domestic rules sought to be applied. How can one apply a rule 
to solve a case without having some regard for the content of the 
rule one is seeking to apply? Interestingly enough, however, it has 
been suggested in an article by Moffatt Hancock in the Canadian 
Bar Review13 that the results reached by courts in the leading Ca­
nadian cases have in fact been defensible from both standpoints of 
common sense and policy.14 The reason would seem to be that 
courts have felt compelled to strain the rule to the limit in order to 
satisfy policy demands imposed by the particular problems before 
them. A good example is the pressure placed upon the Phillips v. 
Eyre rule by the Supreme Court in McLean v. Pettigrew ,15 to per­
mit Quebec law to determine the question of liability between Que­
bec residents facing the obstacle that Ontario law, the lex loci of 
the accident, took away the right of a gratuitous passenger to re- 
couver.16 Herein lie the second basis for dissatisfaction; where 
courts have strained the rule, their reasoning has seemed artificial 
and has failed to address itself to the realities of the problems be­
fore them. It seems reasonable that if the suspicion is correct that 
courts do in fact take policy considerations into account, they 
ought to abandon their clandestine approach in favour of one which
13 (1 9 6 8 ), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 226.
14 Ibid., at pp. 239-44.
is [1945] S.C.R. 62.
i fi Ibid., at p. 77, where Taschereau J. said (translation): “If the act 
with which McLean is charged does not give rise to a civil action in 
Ontario, and if it is not ‘punishable’, in the Province, even if it is 
‘wrongful’ in Quebec, then the respondent cannot succeed.
“I have already said that if the quasi-delict had been committed in 
the Province o f Quebec, the respondent could have claimed by virtue 
of art. 1053 C.C. but it is certain that it has not been shown that civil 
recourse exists in Ontario against the gratuitous driver for the bene­
fit o f a passenger who suffers bodily injuries as the result o f an 
accident. On the contrary the Ontario law denies such action and 
there is no ambiguity in the wording of the Act.
“Hence, no civil recourse exists in Ontario, but is the act ‘punishable’, 
and can it be said that the appellant violated som e provision o f the 
Criminal Code or o f the Ontario Highway Traffic Act?
“The conduct o f the appellant certainly cannot be characterized as 
criminal, and I am not convinced that his carelessness or his incom ­
petence reveal the elements necessary to  qualify his action as a 
crime. A m erican A utom obile Ins. Co. v. Dickson, [1943] 2 D .L.R . 
15, at p. 21: S.C.R. 143, at p. 150. But, it is otherwise, I believe, in 
regard to the charge that he violated a provincial statute, which would 
make his act punishable in Ontario, and as a result ‘not justifiable’.”
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openly discusses those considerations; only in this way can we 
assess and criticize what courts are doing and thereby develop the 
role policy analysis is to play in the solution of these problems.
A problem with the traditional rule is that it reflects a narrow 
territorial concept of law which has led courts to espouse two rather 
presumptuous notions: (1 ) that the state in which the injury oc­
curred necessarily has a legal concern in the question of liability 
arising out of the injury, and (2 ) that a forum can never give 
recognition to a foreign “right” which is not recognized as a right 
by the forum. Yet surely it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify 
an “interested” or “concerned” jurisdiction solely by reference to 
such factors as where the conduct has taken place, where the 
litigation is taking place, or the legal category within which a 
particular claim may conveniently be classified. Surely conflict of 
laws is better looked at as a subject concerned with the deter­
mination of the proper scope of application of the particular laws 
of various legal systems, to examine whether particular laws can 
legitimately claim to be applied to specific legal problems, on the 
assumption that such a claim may be made by more than one 
state in a given situation. In short, we must be wary of general 
rules, for general rules may not satisfy the demands that are placed 
upon a system of conflicts in a free-flowing society. General rules 
that point to the application of the domestic laws of a legal 
system, without first examining those laws, can hardly serve to 
identify jurisdictions that are truly concerned with the outcome. 
It is becoming apparent, especially with respect to motor vehicle 
litigation, that the place of injury may have no legitimate interest in 
the outcome. Why, then, should we bind ourselves to a rule which 
inevitably gives blind recognition to the law of that jurisdiction?
For a number of years now there has been an increasing 
awareness by many persons interested in the study of conflict of 
laws of a need for a restructuring of the subject.17 As has been the 
case in many areas of the law, the impetus has come from the 
United States. In 1963, what many people consider to be a 
breakthrough occurred in the New York Court of Appeals in the 
case of Babcock v. Jackson.18 The Jacksons, residents of New 
York, went to Ontario on a weekend trip taking Miss Babcock, 
also a New York resident, as a guest. While driving on an O n­
tario highway, Jackson lost control of the car and ran into a stone
17 An interesting approach is taken, for exam ple, in Von Mehren and 
Trautman, The Law o f Multistate Problems (Boston, Toronto, 1965).
18 240 N .Y .S. 2d 743 (1 9 6 3 ). See also Symposium on case in 63 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1212 (1 9 6 3 ).
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wall seriously injuring Babcock. Babcock sued Jackson in a New 
York court. The issue turned on whether Babcock would be de­
nied relief by virtue of the operation of the Ontario gratuitous 
passenger provision. This would have been the result if the Court 
had decided to apply the traditional American rule, leaving it to the 
law of the place where a tort is committed to determine the liabil­
ity arising out of the injury. This rule differs from our rule in that 
the forum does not require proof of actionability under its law as a 
condition precedent to recovery. In addition, the lex loci delicti 
rule requires that the plaintiff establish civil actionability under the 
law of the place where the injury has taken place. It is relevant 
to note, however, that even if the Phillips v. Eyre rule had been 
applicable, the Court in Babcock would have faced the same 
dilemma; in either case, the defendant would have been entitled to 
raise, as a bar to his liability, the fact that the Ontario gratuitous 
passenger provision relieved him of legal liability. In the face of 
this, Fuld J. put the question in this way:
Shall the law o f the place o f the tort invariably  govern the avail­
ability of relief for the tort or shall the applicable choice o f law  
rule also reflect a consideration of other factors which are rele­
vant to the purposes served by the enforcement or denial o f the 
remedy?19
In responding to this question he made extensive reference to 
the increasing criticism of the traditional rule and noted a judicial 
trend towards its modification. It is not insignificant that Fuld J., 
himself, had earlier espoused some of the same considerations in 
establishing choice of law patterns to be employed in the solution 
of contracts problems.20 To use his own words:
Justice, fairness and “the best practical result” may best be 
achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction 
which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence 
or the parties has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised 
in the litigation. The merit o f such a rule is that “it gives to the 
place ‘having the m ost interest in the problem* paramount control 
over the legal issues arising out o f a particular factual context” and 
thereby allows the forum to apply “the policy o f the jurisdiction 
most intimately concerned with the outcom e o f the particular 
litigation’ ”.21
The factors emphasized were the essential characteristics of the 
tort, and the relevant purposes of the rules vying for application. 
Looking at the problem from this standpoint, he felt that On­
tario’s interest in having its gratuitous passenger provision apply
19 Ibid., at p. 746.
2/1 Auten  v. Auten. 124 N.E. 2d 99 (1 9 5 4 ).
21 Babcock  v. Jackson, supra fn. 18, at p. 749.
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to this situation was at best minimal. He took into consideration 
the object of the Ontario provision which, he concluded, was to 
prevent collusion between passengers and drivers in the defrauding 
of insurance companies.22 If this were the true purpose of the 
Ontario provision, one might reasonably conclude that the Ontario 
legislature, in enacting it, was interested in protecting Ontario 
insurers and not New York insurers, so that there would be no 
point in construing it to prevent either an Ontario or a New York 
resident from proceeding against a New York insurance company. 
Here he emphasized that the automobile was insured in New York. 
In addition, Ontario could hardly be concerned in imposing limi­
tations on the right of one New York resident to seek compensa­
tion from another New York resident if it was interested in no 
other regard in the determination of legal liability arising out of 
this accident.
The decision illustrates that by analyzing foreign tort prob­
lems in this way, certain alleged conflicts cases can be dismissed 
as jalse conflicts cases. In Babcock the court felt there was never 
really any conflict between the Ontario law and the New York 
law. A conflicts issue only arises in a case where the court can 
detect an interest in the application of the laws of more than one
22 This, o f course, focusses on one o f the defects o f interest analysis. 
Fuld J. based this assumption on a note in 1 U.Tor. L.J. 358 (1 9 3 6 ), 
without attempting to analyse the legislative provision in the context 
of the overall statutory or general tort liability obtaining in Ontario. 
In commenUng on this, Maurice Rosenberg facetiously remarked in 67 
Colum. L. Rev. 459 (1 9 6 7 ): “Why did our civilized neighbours in On­
tario fashion this barbaric law? We are told it was done from a mis­
guided purpose to protect insurance com panies from the frauds of 
insured motorists —  who otherwise presumably would have had great 
sport hurtling their cars o ff high cliffs so  their passenger friends might 
collect easy money as personal injury damages. This intelligence is 
derived, not from reading what the statute says or its legislative history 
records, but from a piece in the University o f Toronto Law Joumai, 
enUtled ‘Survey o f Canadian Legislation’.” There are, however, certain 
limitations on the extent of the judicial inquiry. One important one 
is the rule in Canadian jurisdictions that the legislative history of an 
Act cannot be used as a judicial aid to its interpretation. This has not 
precluded judges from interpreting statutes in other contexts, how ­
ever, and one would be unduly pessimistic if  he considered that this 
limitation was fatal to interest analysis in conflict o f laws. A n­
other interesting story is related by A llen Linden in a note in (1 9 6 2 ),
40 Can. Bar Rev. 284, at p. 286, fn. 11: “A  prominent Toronto 
negligence lawyer tells a story about M itchell Hepburn who had just 
been elected Premier o f Ontario when the subsection was passed. It is 
said that he had vowed to pass such a statute if he ever became 
Premier because he had once been sued by two hitchhikers who were 
injured while gratuitous passengers in his autom obile.”
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concerned jurisdiction, in which case the court must choose which 
of these two laws has the better claim for application to the par­
ticular problem. Consider, for example, this variation on the 
actual facts of Babcocki23 Suppose the gratuitous passenger pro­
vision were found in New York legislation rather than in Ontario 
legislation. One might conclude from the failure of the Ontario 
legislature to enact such a provision that it felt there was some 
point in permitting gratuitous passengers the benefit of normal tort 
remedies. One might argue at least two reasons for this: (1 ) the 
imposition of liability would have the effect of inducing more care­
ful driving habits on the part of drivers carrying passengers in their 
automobiles and hence improve safety on Ontario highways; (2 ) 
it would permit injured parties to recover damages for their injur­
ies and thereby to indemnify persons within the province of On­
tario to whom the injured party may be indebted, for example, doc­
tors, hospitals, and the Government itself in the presence of a com­
pulsory health plan.24 This leads to the difficult and important ques­
tion which Babcock v. Jackson leaves open: How does one evaluate 
competing interests in a true conflicts case? Should the forum in­
variably apply its own law in any situation where it can detect an 
interest in its application, notwithstanding that that interest may 
be significantly out-weighed by a competing interest of a foreign 
jurisdiction?25 There is much to be said for this from the stand­
23 This variation was put forth by W illis Reese in a symposium on 
Babcock appearing in (1 9 6 3 ), 63 Colum. L.Rev. 1212, at p. 1256.
24 Another interesting variation on Babcock  v. Jackson arose in K ell 
v. Henderson, 270 N .Y.S. 2d 552 (1 9 6 6 ), where an Ontario motor­
ist was injured in N ew  York while a gratuitous passenger in an On­
tario automobile. The Court applied New York law, refusing 
permission to the defendants to plead the Ontario statute. Be­
cause its facts were directly reverse from Babcock, one might have 
expected the Court to apply Ontario law as the most interested 
jurisdiction. Donald Trautman suggests that this might be a valid 
point had the Ontario legislation evinced a clear policy in favour 
o f protecting Ontario insurers. However he felt this was not 
the case and that the original policies underlying the provisions 
had lost their vitality in Ontario, basing his conclusions on certain 
pieces o f evidence discussed in his note. Accordingly, New York 
had validly asserted its interest in awarding compensation to per­
sons injured on its highways: 67 Colum. L.Rev. 465 (1 9 6 7 ).
25 This view has its m ost popular expression in an article by B. 
Currie in (1 9 5 9 ), 8 Duke L. J. 171, at pp. 177-8 where he states:
“If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the 
application o f its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even 
though the foreign state also has an interest in the application o f  
its contrary policy, and a fortiori, it should apply the law o f the 
forum if the foreign state has no such interest.”
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points of convenience and familiarity; yet it seriously distorts the 
role suggested for conflict of laws earlier, to analytically delimit 
the application of legal rules, be they laws of the forum, or laws of 
a foreign jurisdiction. The indiscriminate application of the law of 
the forum not only distorts the process, but may, in the long run, 
prove detrimental to the interests of the forum by dissuading 
courts in other jurisdictions from giving proper deference to its laws 
in circumstances where its laws should on analysis apply. In other 
words, a forum-biased approach retards the operation of one of 
the fundamental forces in the conflict of laws, comity. On the 
other hand, if one concedes that the forum ought not automatically 
to apply its own law wherever it has an interest, what criteria are 
available to weigh competing interests? Does the process become 
so complicated as to defy application in a judicial process? These 
are questions upon which much has been written; however, no 
attempt will be made here to summarize the development of 
American case law and its attendant academic criticism. Nor is it 
suggested that Babcock v. Jackson is in any sense of the word “the 
law” in the United States. It has been discussed primarily because 
it marks the fruition of the interest analysis in judicial terms, and 
because it continues to attract much attention as a rallying point 
for the proponents of the new analysis.26
26 M ention should also be made o f the recent case o f T ooker v. L opez, 
249 N .E . 2d 394 (1 9 6 9 ), where the Court o f Appeals o f  N ew  
York reviewed its original role in B abcock  and summarized the de­
velopment of the case law in that court over the years following 
Babcock. A  N ew  York domiciliary attending university in M ichi­
gan was killed in an automobile accident in that state. The auto­
mobile belonged to  her father and was registered and insured in N ew  
York. The Michigan law permitted recovery in respect o f the 
wrongful death o f guest passengers only where the wilful m iscon­
duct or gross negligence o f the driver could be shown. In one of 
the judgments upholding the application of N ew  York law Keat­
ing J. said at pp. 398-9: “N ew  York’s ‘grave concern’ in afford­
ing recovery for the injuries suffered by Catharina Tooker, a 
New  York domiciliary, and the loss suffered by her fam ily as a 
result o f  her wrongful death, is evident merely in stating the 
policy which our law reflects. On the other hand, Michigan has 
no interest in whether a N ew York plaintiff is denied recovery 
against a N ew  York defendant where the car is insured here. The 
fact that the deceased guest and driver were in M ichigan for an 
extended period of time is plainly irrelevant.” And Fuld J., who 
had decided Babcock, reviewed the developm ent of the law thus 
at p. 403: ‘‘Babcock  and the decisions it heralded place in our 
hands an instrument not confined to the rare and unusual situation. 
Rather, they comprise a sound foundation for a set o f basic prin­
ciples which the practicing lawyer, as well as the conflicts scholar, 
may be able to wield with good results. They have helped us
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It remains to consider the significance of all this to a lawyer 
in New Brunswick at the advent of the 1970s. Does one sum­
marily dismiss these ideas as being more of that American inno­
vation unsuitcd to Canadian needs? This might very well have 
been the attitude even a year ago, and a law teacher might never 
have been so presumptuous as to address a group of practicing 
lawyers on interest analysis in conflict of laws were it not for two 
factors:
(1 ) The continuing activity of the Special Committee of the Con­
ference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in 
Canada, who have adopted a model Foreign Torts Act27 to 
replace the rule in Phillips v. Eyre. This would allow for the 
application of the law of the state having the most substan­
uncover the underlying values and policies which are operative 
in this area o f the law. N ow  that these values and policies have 
been revealed, we may proceed to the next stage in the evolu­
tion of the law —  the formulation of a few rules o f general 
applicability, promising a fair level o f predictability. Although 
no rule may be found or framed to guarantee a satisfying result 
in every case, we cannot hope to deal justly with the legion of 
multi-state highway accident cases by regarding each case as one 
of a kind and unique.” He then offered three guidelines "prof­
fered as a beginning, not as an end, to the problems o f sound 
and fair adjudication in the troubled world o f the automobile 
guest statute”.
27 1 966 Proceedings o f Conference o f  Commissioners on U niform ­
ity o f Legislation in Canada, p. 62. The text of the model statute 
is as follows:
1. When deciding the rights and liabilities o f the parties 
to an action in tort the court shall apply the local law of 
the state which has the most substantial connection with the 
occurrence and with the parties regardless o f whether or not 
the wrong is o f such a character that it would have been 
actionable if  committed in this Province.
2. W hen determining whether a particular state has a sub­
stantial connection with the occurrence and the parties the 
court shall consider the following important contacts:
(a )  the place where the injury occurred;
(b ) the place where the conduct occurred;
(c )  the domicile and place o f business o f the parties; 
and
(d )  the place where the relationship, if  any, between 
the parties is centered.
3. When deciding which state, among the states having any 
contacts within section 2, has the most substantial connection  
with the occurrence and the parties, the court shall consider 
chiefly the purpose and policy o f each of the rules o f local 
law that is proposed to be applied.
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tial connection with the occurrence and with the parties, 
taking into account various contacts, including the place of 
injury, the place of conduct, the domicile and place of busi­
ness of the parties. In determining the state with the most 
substantial connection the court is to consider the purpose and 
policy of each of the rules proposed for application.28
(2 ) The fact that in a recent case before the House of Lords, 
Chaplin v. Boys,'29 two Lords30, gave, at least in theory, a 
limited role to the technique of policy analysis.
It is proposed to discuss only this second factor. Chaplin v. 
Boys is important inasmuch as it represents, in many respects, an 
English counterpart to Babcock v. Jackson, which, as might be ex­
pected, was cited to the House in argument. It raised the question 
of the true effect of and scope of application of the traditional rule 
and afforded an opportunity for the adoption of a new approach 
to contemporary tort problems. In many ways the decision is a 
disappointment; the fact that the state of the law after the decision 
is hardly more satisfactory than before would seem a major dis­
appointment. Nevertheless, it is optimistically suggested that a 
limited avenue may have opened for lawyers seeking to attach 
significant judicial authority to innovative arguments in favour 
of the application of a law not patently applicable under a strict 
Phillips v. Eyre formula. The House of Lords is of considerable 
persuasive authority still in the courts of this province, and one 
might reasonably anticipate that arguments endorsed by individual 
members of the House will be carefully scrutinized before being 
rejected by our Court of Appeal.
Having posed this justification, it remains to say something 
about the case itself. The plaintiff and defendant were both Brit­
ish subjects, domiciled and resident in England, but serving with 
the British forces in Malta. The plaintiff was injured in a high­
way accident due to the established negligence of the defendant.
2S The model statute is commented upon favourably in Hancock, 
Canadian - Am erican Torts in the C onflict of Laws: The R evival
of Policy-D eterm ined Construction Analysis (1 9 6 8 ), 46 Can. Bar
Rev. 226, at pp. 244-51; see also article by Horace E. Read, chair­
man of the Special Committee o f the Conference, in 1 Can. Leg.
Studies 277 (1 9 6 8 ); note also, reaction to the draft in 1967 
Proceedings of the Conference o f Commissioners on Uniform ity of 
Legislation in Canada at pp. 153 ff. For an opposed reaction see 
J. A. Clarence Smith. The Foreign Torts A ct: Look Before You  
Leap (1 9 7 0 ), 20 U. Tor. L.J. 81.
29 [1969] 2 A ll E.R. 1085.
30 Lords Wilberforce and Hodson.
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In bringing his action in England, the plaintiff alleged pain and 
suffering as one of his heads of damage, which, in fact, con­
stituted the substantial portion of his claim. The trial judge 
awarded general damages for pain and suffering notwithstanding 
the important consideration that under Maltese law there could 
be no recovery for this aspect of the injury. It is understandable, 
therefore, that the defendant, seeking to limit his liability, argued 
that Maltese law rendered this aspect of the tort “justifiable” . This 
raised squarely the question as to the meaning of the rule in 
Phillips v. Eyre. It also raised the interesting question whether, 
given the proper interpretation of Phillips v. Eyre, the rule must 
invariably be applied to determine liability for a foreign tort.
A brief review of the speeches in the House would seem to 
be warranted. Lord Guest31 indicated clearly that he did not wish 
to be drawn into a broad discussion of the American trends and 
stated that he was deciding the issue on a “very narrow ground”. 
He defined the Phillips v. Eyre rule in terms of double action­
ability: in order for an action to be brought in England upon a 
tort committed abroad the conduct must be actionable (1 ) by Eng­
lish law and (2 ) by the law of the country in which the conduct 
occurred.32 Implicit in this is a rejection of Machado v. Fontes 
to the extent that it suggests that one need only establish a lack 
of “innocence” in terms of a contravention of some statutory 
provision. Applying this test to the situation before him, Lord 
Guest was saying that in order for the plaintiff to recover he had 
to establish a right of action in terms of English law, which was 
no problem, but also in terms of Maltese law, which was a prob­
lem in view of the Maltese provision that pain and suffering is 
not permitted as a head of damage. He solved this problem by 
resorting to traditional analysis in terms of “substantive-proce­
dural” classification.33 His feeling was that the Maltese provision 
could not be characterized as a substantive rule, relating to the 
nature of the tort claim itself, but rather as a procedural rule, an 
element in the quantification of compensation. Given the fact of 
the actual tortious invasion, the “dollars and cents” aspect of the 
injury was simply a procedural matter to be determined by the 
forum. Therefore, the English court was perfectly capable of 
evaluating the damages to be awarded in respect of the foreign 
injury, even where those damages would be far in excess of what 
a court of the place where the injury occurred would award.
31 [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085, at pp. 1094 ff.
Ibid., at p. 1095.
33 Ibid.
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Lord Hodson,34 after looking at some of the early cases pre­
ceding and following the actual decision in Phillips v. Eyre, also 
expressed the opinion that the rule in Phillips v. Eyre, properly 
interpreted, sets out a test for double actionability. He concluded 
that the decision in Machado v. Forties was wrong and should be 
overruled.35 But he differed from Lord Guest in his analysis of 
the Maltese law. He was persuaded that the question whether loss 
of earning capacity and pain and suffering are admissible heads of 
damage, is a question of substantive law.3“ In so far as this is a 
substantive question and affects actionability, the law of Malta 
must be applied in favour of the defendant. This reasoning left 
him in a position where, upon analyzing the issues in the light of 
what he felt was the proper interpretation of the rule in Phillips v. 
Eyre, he would be forced to deny relief to the plaintiff. Obviously 
his preference was against this, so he was compelled to consider 
whether the general rule must invariably govern the extent of 
legal liability arising out of a foreign tort. In doing so, he placed 
considerable emphasis on the precise words used by Willes J. in 
Phillips v. Eyre, that the rule was “a general rule”, and con­
cluded that these words should be interpreted to give a court 
leeway where it would be against public policy to admit or to 
exclude a particular claim.37 He emphasized that the parties were 
British nationals, resident in England, and only temporarily in 
Malta on service at the time of the injury, and felt that these 
factors were more significant than the mere fact that the accident 
had taken place in Malta. Resting his disposition of the case on 
the American Law Institute Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws,38 he went on to make the following statements:
If controlling effect is given to the law of the jurisdiction which 
because of its relationship with the occurrence and the parties has 
the greater concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation, 
the ends o f justice are likely to be achieved although, as the 
American authorities show, there is a difficult task presented for 
decision o f the courts, and uncertainty has lead to dissenting judg­
ments in the appellate courts.
It is to be expected that a court will favour its own policies over 
those o f other States and be inclined to give its own rules a wider 
application than it will give to  those o f other states . . . .  This 
tendency is convenient. To insist on the choice o f the law o f the 
place where the wrong was committed has an attraction and leads
34 Ibid., at pp. 1088 / / .
35 Ibid., at p. 1091.
3* Ibid., at p. 1093.
37 Ibid., at p. 1092.
38 Proposed official draft, May 1, 1968, s. 145.
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to certainty but in modern conditions o f speedy and frequent travel 
between countries a place of the wrong may be and often is de­
termined by accidental circumstances, as in this case where the 
parties were but temporarily carrying out their service in Malta.39
Lord Wilberforce, delivering what would seem to be the 
strongest speech of the House,40 phrased his interpretation of the 
rule in Phillips v. Eyre a little differently. He accepted the ortho­
dox view that the first branch of the rule lays down not a jurisdic­
tional test but a choice of law rule, and concluded that the sub­
stantive law to be applied was the lex fori. However, as a condition 
to obtaining relief the plaintiff must also establish non-justifiability 
under the law of the place where the tort occurred. He suggested 
that, in applying its own substantive law, the forum must be pre­
pared to give a greater role to the lex loci delicti than most courts 
have heretofore given. Courts must take into account the fact that 
under the lex loci delicti, a certain injury may not give rise to 
legal relief. He said:
I would, therefore, restate the basic rule o f English law with re­
gard to foreign torts as requiring actionability as a tort according 
to English law, subject to the condition that civil liability in re­
spect o f the relevant claim exists as between the actual parties 
under tjie law o f the foreign country where the act was done.41
In deciding this, it was necessary to reject Machado v. Forties, and 
he, like Lord Hodson, specifically agreed with the Court of Appeal 
that Machado v. Fontes ought to be overruled.42 In doing so, 
Lord Wilberforce found himself in the same position as Lord 
Hodson. Taking the view that the Maltese law provided a sub­
stantive barrier to relief under the general rule, he was forced to 
conclude that the rule in Phillips v. Eyre provided sufficient flex­
ibility to permit a court to deviate from the rule to take into 
account the varying interests and considerations of policy which 
may arise when one or more foreign elements are present. He said: 
G iven the general rule . . .  as one which will normally apply to 
foreign torts, I think that the necessary flexibility can be ob­
tained from that principle which represents at least a com m on  
denominator o f the United States decisions, namely, through segre­
gation o f the relevant issue and consideration whether, in relation 
to that issue, the relevant foreign rule ought, as a matter of policy 
. . .  to be applied. For this purpose it is necessary to identify 
the policy o f the rule, to enquire to what situations, with what con­
tacts, it was intended to apply; whether not to apply it, in the 
circumstances o f the instant case, would serve any interest which
39 Chaplin  v. Boys, supra fn. 29, at p. 1094.
40 Ibid., at pp. 1097 //.
41 Ibid.. at p. 1102.
42 Ibid., at p. 1101.
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the rule was devised to meet. This technique appears well adapted 
to meet cases where the lex delicti either limits or excludes 
damages for personal injury; it appears even necessary and inevit­
able. N o  purely mechanical rule can properly do justice to the 
great variety o f cases where persons com e together in a foreign 
jurisdiction for different purposes with different pre-existing re­
lationships, from the background of different legal systems. It 
will not be invoked in every case or even, probably, in many cases.
The general rule must apply unless clear and satisfying grounds 
are shown why it should be departed from and what solution, 
derived from what other rule, should be preferred.43
What is regrettable is that, following such a clear exposition 
of analytical technique, Lord Wilberforce failed to analyse the 
Maltese and English laws from a policy standpoint, and, accord­
ingly, failed to indicate which factors were dominant in rejecting 
the application of the Maltese rule. He merely emphasized the 
same general factors previously emphasized by Lord Hodson, 
that neither party was a Maltese resident or citizen, and that 
Malta really had no interest in applying its restrictive rule to out­
siders. What would have been preferable would be his informing 
us why these factors should be important in the light of the policy 
underlying the two different legal positions.
Of the two remaining speeches, only that of Lord'Pearson44 
merits comment. He emphatically and articulately rejected the 
double actionability requirement, supported the interpretation 
placed on the rule in Phillips v. Eyre by the Court of Appeal in 
Machado v. Fontes, and gave a plausible explanation of why the 
thrust of that decision ought to be preserved. He suggested that 
by imposing a requirement of double actionability, an unfair burden 
is placed upon the plaintiff, in that he has the “worst of both laws” . 
He also suggested that in some cases it would prevent the English 
court from giving judgment in accordance with its own ideas of 
justice. This difficulty, of course, would be alleviated by the flex­
ible interpretation of the general rule illustrated by Lords Hodson 
and Wilberforce. Lord Pearson indicated, however, that the policy 
approach was the less desirable of the alternatives; he preferred 
the more forum-oriented approach exhibited in Machado v. Fontes.
The question remains, what conclusions can be drawn from 
the decision? All five of the Lords were prepared to uphold 
the award of relief to the plaintiff for pain and suffering, yet clearly 
there were differing reasons for doing so. What are the im­
plications for Canadian lawyers? Consideration ought to be given 
to the following observations:
43 Ibid., at p. 1104.
44 Ibid.. at pp. 1105 //.
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(1 ) Three of the five Lords adopted an interpretation of the 
rule in Phillips v. Eyre which was incompatible with the interpre­
tation previously placed upon the rule by the Court of Appeal in 
Machado v. Fontes. It would, therefore, appear that this latter 
decision has been effectively overruled insofar as the law of Eng­
land is concerned even though the three Lords could have achieved 
the same disposition of the case without varying the earlier inter­
pretation of the rule.
(2 ) If Machado v. Fontes is no longer a viable authority in 
England, Canadian courts presumably will have to look long and 
hard at the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in McLean 
v. Pettigrew. Lawyers might anticipate a change in the Canadian 
position as to the meaning of the second branch of the rule.
(3 ) It is doubtful that a court will adopt a change in the inter­
pretation of the rule in Phillips v. Eyre without providing itself 
with an escape valve in support of the lex jori, enabling the 
forum to apply its own law, reflecting its own notions of fairness, 
justice and policy. It would seem that if Canadian courts are to 
interpret the Phillips v. Eyre rule as requiring double actionability, 
they may well adopt it only as a “general rule”, in which case they 
may be receptive to arguments based on policy analysis, in proper 
cases. Notwithstanding the fact that only two of the five Lords in 
Chaplin v. Boys were prepared to talk about interest analysis, this 
may well be the direction in which the law is moving. It is sug­
gested that far more significance should be placed on the fact that 
two of the Law Lords spoke in terms of interest analysis, than on 
the fact that three of the Lords rather perfunctorily rejected the 
application of something which they referred to as “the proper 
law of the tort”, without giving any indication that they were even 
interested in considering the objectives and techniques of interest 
analysis.45
(4 ) As a word of caution, it is important to emphasize that 
Lords Hodson and Wilberforce, in delimiting the application of 
Phillips v. Eyre, were motivated by a desire to exclude the opera­
tion of the rule so as to be in a position to apply the law of the 
forum. Strictly speaking, their speeches only go so far as to permit
45 It is noteworthy that both Lords G uest and Donovan rejected the 
application o f  the “proper law o f the tort” in the U .K . for the 
same reason that Upjohn and Diplock L.JJ. had rejected the 
concept in the Court o f Appeal, the reason being primarily the 
constitutional differences between the U.K . and the U .S. The im ­
plication is that while the concept may not be good for the U.K ., 
it may be good for the U .S. What views might their Lordships 
have entertained about Canada?
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a court to use its own law to determine foreign tort liability where 
policy and justice demand that the court ignore a foreign rule in 
favour of its own “better” rule. The question remains whether a 
court could be persuaded, by the reasoning of the two Lords, to 
ignore its own law where it feels the foreign law has a better claim 
to application. Could a court be persuaded to grant relief under 
foreign law notwithstanding that the injury is not actionable under 
its own law?46 It seems clear that the speeches referred to, even 
under their most generous interpretation, do not go that far.
(5 ) As a further word of caution, it is important to emphasize 
that these speeches in Chaplin v. Boys, like the rule in Phillips v. 
Eyre itself, imply the prerequisite that the injury complained of 
be a foreign tort, in the sense that the injury occurs in a jurisdiction 
other than the jurisdiction in which the action is brought. These 
questions then arise: Is policy analysis at all relevant in litigation 
arising out of an accident occurring within the jurisdiction in which 
the action is brought? Would Lords Hodson and Wilberforce in 
Chaplin v. Boys have uttered the same language had the litigation 
involved two Maltese residents injured in a car accident in London? 
Would they, in such a case, have given any consideration to the 
multi-jurisdictional aspects of the case? One can only conclude that 
they would not: Under traditional analysis, such a situation would 
not have been regarded as raising a conflicts issue at all. It seems 
that the development of the law has blinded us to the possible 
relevance of extra-jurisdictional factors other than the conduct or 
injury itself.
One is forced to the conclusion that even in the face of the 
encouraging language of Lords Hodson and Wilberforce, the re­
tention of Phillips v. Eyre as a “general rule” imposes serious 
limitations on the extent to which lawyers may base arguments on 
policy considerations. Clearly the way is not yet open for lawyers 
to argue in the terms advanced by some of the American writers. 
Nor does the way seem open to argue in terms of the model 
statute of the Uniformity Commissioners. Nevertheless, there 
would seem to be some scope for the lawyer to embark upon policy 
analysis in terms of the traditional rule in Phillips v. Eyre. Even 
if, to use Lord Wilberforce’s words, the general rule should only 
be departed from where there are “clear and satisfying grounds”
4,5 This would seem to offend the leading case of The H ailey  (1 8 6 8 ),  
L.R. 2 P.C. 193: but see Hancock, Tort Problem s in C onflict o f  
Laws R esolved  by  Statutory Construction: The H ailey and O ther 
O lder Cases R evisited  (1 9 6 8 ), 18 U. Tor. L J . 331, where the in­
consistency of The H ailey dictum  with earlier cases is stressed.
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for doing so, it is important to emphasize that these grounds 
normally exist wherever there are strong policy reasons for de­
viating from the rule.
What considerations might be borne in mind then in arguing 
for a deviation from the general rule? It would seem possible to 
argue as a general proposition that a court ought not to bar a 
claim in respect of a foreign tort under either br?nch of the 
Phillips v. Eyre rule unless the law which the rule requires the 
court to apply can support some substantial interest in being ap­
plied to the case at hand. This would establish a minimum re­
quirement for the application of the general rule. In determining 
whether a substantial interest exists, a test would be to question 
what the impact, in socio-economic terms, would be of a failure to 
apply a particular rule. Would a failure to apply a rule constitute 
a setback to the state in terms of the policy it wishes to effectuate 
through the medium of its legal institutions? Testing this in relation 
to the first of the hypothetical cases given at the outset, involving 
the New Brunswick gratuitous passenger rule, or indeed with 
reference to the facts of Martin v. Marmen,47 one must ask what 
the impact would be, in relation to the socio-economic forces 
lying behind the rule, of a failure to apply the New Brunswick 
rule in these cases? Should the court automatically reject the 
claim pursuant to the first branch of the rule in Phillips v. E yre1. 
Or should it only reject the claim under the rule where the right of 
action is taken away in New Brunswick by a statute or common 
law rule which has, in terms of its policy base, a substantial inter­
est in being applied to the situation at hand? Is it appropriate to 
apply the New Brunswick gratuitous passenger rule in an action 
between Quebec residents? In Martin v. Marmen, where the auto­
mobile was insured outside New Brunswick, should a New Bruns­
wick rule aimed at the protection of insurers be applied to deny 
a claim if the insurer is not a New Brunswick Company? Suppose 
it is an Ontario Company licensed to do business in New Bruns­
wick; is our law aimed at the protection of such entities? Possibly 
one would say yes. in that the legislature may be presumed to have 
enacted the section for the protection of insurers doing business in 
New Brunswick regardless of the locus of the policy; and there­
fore there may exist a substantial interest in the application of the 
New Brunswick rule.' But suppose the defendant was not insured in 
Martin v. Marmen? Or suppose in an analogous situation it is an 
American Company not licensed in New Brunswick which is af­
fected. Should this not change the complexion of the issue? And
47 (1 9 6 9 ), 6 D.L.R. (3 d ) 77 (N .B .C .A .).
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in measuring the impact of a failure to apply the lex fori, is it not 
relevant to examine the current status of the rule, to determine 
whether it is supported by a contemporary policy base. It may 
very well be that the court ought not to bar a claim under either 
branch of the rule on the basis of an out-dated law, especially 
where good reasons exist to support the claim either under the 
lex loci delicti or the lex fori as the case may be. To take a rep­
resentative case, the gratuitous passenger rule has come under 
criticism in this jurisdiction48 as in others; it may very well be 
that in a proper case, lack of contemporary policy behind the 
rule may provide a good reason for a court’s refusing to apply it.
Without pursuing the policy behind the rule (and it may very 
well be more complicated than I am suggesting)49, let me simply 
make the point that a court might well consider these matters 
carefully before rejecting a claim on the basis of the first branch 
of the rule. If the court had determined in Martin v. Marmen, 
for example, that there was no reason to apply the first branch of 
the rule, it might very well have gone on to hold that the plaintiff 
had an action under the lex loci delicti, Quebec. One can easily 
rationalize the Quebec interest in terms of conduct on its high­
ways; by imposing liability on host drivers to gratuitous passeng­
ers, the level of safety on its highways is theoretically raised.
A similar analysis ought to be made before denying relief 
under the second branch of the rule, the requirement of action­
ability under the lex loci delicti. Before conceding to a defendant 
the effectiveness of a defence of contributory negligence or of a 
defence under foreign fatal accidents legislation, one ought to con­
sider very carefully, as did the New York court in Babcock, 
whether the thrust of these foreign statutory defences can possibly 
carry to the facts of the case at hand. For what object does the 
foreign defence exist? Would its rejection in the case at hand, in 
New Brunswick, have any social or economic impact in relation 
to the objectives of the foreign law? Is it a viable rule in the sense 
that it is supported by a contemporary policy? What legislative or 
judicial evidence is there of the intended extension of the foreign 
rule to the precise facts of the case before the court? It is, pre­
sumably, in this situation that the greatest possibility exists for 
persuading a court to depart from the general rule. For here
48 The abolition o f the rule was advocated in a general brief on law  
reform presented to  the N ew  Brunswick Cabinet by the Canadian 
Bar Association (N .B . Branch) in February 1970.
49 See fn. 22, supra.
U.N.B. L A W  JO U R N A L 33
the argument is in support of the forum adopting its own rule for 
the solution of an inter-jurisdictional problem. Here a court may 
appeal, not merely to familiarity with its own law, which, ob­
jectively, is not really a very strong reason for applying the lex fori, 
but may appeal to the comparative justice as between the parties. 
A court may be persuaded, as was Lord Denning in the Court of 
Appeal in Boys v. Chaplin,™ that it is patently unfair that a for­
eign rule ought to stand as a bar to a claim for compensation by 
one New Bruns wicker against another New Bruns wicker unless 
an extremely cogent policy reason for applying the foreign defence 
can be established. And even where the court may be precluded 
from adopting such a chauvinistic approach in cases where the 
suit is by or against a foreign defendant, a court may very well be 
receptive to a well-structured argument that the lex loci delicti 
has no substantial interest in being applied to the problem at hand.
While it is suggested the approach just outlined may be 
arguable as a minimum prerequisite to the application of the 
general rule in Phillips v. Eyre, the question inevitably remains: 
In how many cases would it be applicable? Herein, of course, lies 
its limitation. While it may be an appropriate line of argument 
in classic cases such as those structured at the outset for purposes 
of illustration, many cases are more complicated. The slightest 
change of circumstances alters the complexity of the problem. 
Suppose one of the parties is from a foreign jurisdiction, one from 
the forum. This may impede the argument that either the forum or 
the place of injury is a completely disinterested jurisdiction. In 
short, the approach advanced would be applicable mainly to what 
have been termed “false conflicts” cases. But what of true con­
flicts cases, where both the lex fori and lex loci are interested 
jurisdictions? Can a court, within the confines of the general rule 
in Phillips v. Eyre, assess the relative strength or weight of the 
competing interests? Presumably one would have great difficulty 
in convincing a Canadian court of this on the basis of the existing 
authorities. It may well be that few would agree that any of the 
speeches in Chaplin v. Boys can be taken to support even the 
limited proposition outlined above, let alone a full-fledged under­
taking in terms of interest analysis. It may well take legislation, 
at a minimum along the lines of the draft provisions of the Special 
Committee, to persuade a court to embark on such an undertaking; 
and it will undoubtedly take legislation to persuade a court of its 
authority to apply foreign law in relation to tortious conduct
so [19681 1 A ll E.R. 283 (C .A .).
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occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum.51 Never­
theless, the remoteness of prospects for a wholesale change in 
approach to these problems ought not to discourage lawyers from 
exploring even the limited potential within the structure of the 
existing rules for rational solutions to problems inappropriately 
handled by those rules.
1 Except, o f course, where the tort involves an issue which, by 
other conflicts rules, is to be solved by the application of a foreign 
rule. See the emphasis on this so-called third rule by J.A. Clarence 
Smith in (1 9 7 0 ), 20 U. Tor. L.J. 81, at p. 82, where he states: “It 
is equally certain . . . that there is a third rule to the effect that 
some defences, which we may describe as being o f a ‘non-tort’ 
nature, do not depend on the law either o f the trying court or of 
the place of commission. In an action for conversion, for example, 
a defence founded on the defendant’s own title to the property 
would not be decided either by the court’s own law or by that of 
the place o f alleged conversion.”
